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Abstract
We build a model of informal risk-sharing among agents organized in a social network.
A connection between individuals serves as collateral that can be used to enforce insur-
ance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements for any
network structure, and develop two main results. (1) Expansive networks, where every
group of agents have a large number of links with the rest of the community relative
to the size of the group, facilitate better risk-sharing. In particular, “two-dimensional”
village networks organized by geography are suﬃciently expansive to allow very good
risk-sharing. (2) In second-best arrangements, agents organize in endogenous “risk-
sharing islands” in the network, where shocks are shared fully within but imperfectly
across islands. As a result, risk-sharing in second-best arrangements is local: socially
closer agents insure each other more. In an application of the model, we explore the
spillover eﬀect of development aid on the consumption of non-treated individuals.
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and suggestions.Households in developing countries are often exposed to substantial risk. Obtaining formal
insurance against this risk can be diﬃcult: due to weaknesses in the legal system, ﬁnancial and
insurance markets are often underdeveloped. To cope with this problem, households sometimes rely
on informal risk-sharing arrangements, such as exchanging gifts or providing transfers and services
to those in need. Evidence suggests that these informal arrangements frequently take place in the
social network. For instance, Townsend (1994) emphasizes the importance of informal insurance
networks in Indian villages; similarly, Udry (1994) documents that the majority of transfers take
place between neighbors and relatives in Northern Nigeria. The prevalence of transfers in the
developing world is also illustrated by Figure 1, which depicts the web of ﬁnancial and asset transfers
in a shantytown in Peru.
In this paper, we develop a model of informal risk-sharing that formalizes the role of the social
network in providing contract enforcement. In our economy, agents organized in an exogenously
given social network face endowment risk. To obtain insurance, these agents engage in an informal
risk-sharing contract, which speciﬁes a set of transfers contingent on the realization of uncertainty.
This contract involves moral hazard, because ex post, individuals who are required to make transfers
may prefer to deviate and withhold payment. Informal contract enforcement comes from the fact
that failure to make a promised payment to a friend leads to losing the associated link. In turn,
losing a link is costly, because agents derive utility from their remaining network connections. This
utility value of links represents either the present value of future interaction or more direct “social”
beneﬁts, and can be used as social collateral to provide informal contract enforcement.
Our goal is to understand the degree and structure of informal insurance in social networks
using this model. Our ﬁrst main result is a characterization of the degree of risk-sharing that can
obtain in a given network. We begin with identifying a property of networks — expansiveness,
measured with the number of links that sets of agents have with others in the community, relative
to the number of agents in the set — that facilitates good risk-sharing. To gain intuition about
this property, consider the three example networks depicted in Figure 2. Among these networks,
the inﬁnite line in Figure 2a is the least expansive, because even large sets of consecutive agents
have only two links with the rest of the community. Higher expansion is obtained in the inﬁnite
“plane” network of Figure 2b, where the “perimeter” of square shaped sets of agents grows with
size, and yet more expansive is the inﬁnite binary tree, where the perimeter of all sets grows at
least proportionally with size. The connection between expansiveness and risk-sharing is intuitive:
1having more links with the rest of the network allows for higher transfers, which makes it easier for
every set of agents to dispose of their set-speciﬁc idiosyncratic risk.
To quantify the implications of expansiveness for insurance, we ﬁrst show that perfect risk-
sharing only obtains in highly expansive networks like the inﬁnite binary tree. In these networks,
the perimeter of every set is at least proportional to its size, which makes full sharing feasible even in
the improbable event when all agents in a large set receive a negative income shock. However, this
high level of expansiveness is unlikely to obtain in real-world networks: as Figure 1 illustrates, in
practice networks of transfers and gifts are organized partly on the basis of geographic closeness, and
hence are more similar to the plane. Motivated by this observation, we turn to explore partial risk-
sharing in less expansive networks. We begin by showing that when shocks are not too correlated,
the plane network allows for reasonably good risk-sharing. For an intuition, assume that endowment
shocks are i.i.d. Independence implies that the standard deviation of the total endowment in any
set of agents is proportional to the square root of set size. But on the plane, the perimeter of sets
is also at least proportional to the square root of size, implying that “typical” shocks can pass
through the perimeter. Thus most sets of agents can dispose of their idiosyncratic shocks, which
results in reasonably good insurance. This logic also shows that risk-sharing is necessarily poor on
the line, because the perimeter of interval sets is uniformly bounded.
What do these results imply about insurance in real-world networks like Figure 1? To address
this question, we next consider a class of “geographic networks,” that have a map representation
where agents tend to have connections in multiple directions. We show that the expansion properties
of these networks are similar to the plane, and hence they allow for very good but imperfect risk-
sharing. In particular, we predict reasonably good informal insurance for real-world villages like the
one depicted in Figure 1, because two-dimensional village networks are likely to be “geographic.”
This theoretical result is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Townsend (1994), Ogaki and
Zhang (2001) and Mazzocco (2007), who document very good and in some cases perfect risk-sharing
in Indian villages.
The above results constitute a quantitative analysis of the degree of informal risk-sharing. Our
second main contribution is a qualitative analysis of insurance behavior in constrained eﬃcient
“second-best” arrangements. We show that in these arrangements, for every realization of uncer-
tainty, the network can be partitioned into a set of endogenously organized connected components
called “risk-sharing islands.” This partition has the property that shocks are completely shared
within, but only imperfectly across islands. For an intuition, note that in each realization, island
2boundaries are deﬁned by links where agents are paying the maximum incentive compatible transfer
amount. Higher transfers over these links are not incentive compatible, and hence insurance across
island boundaries is limited; but links inside an island do allow for marginally higher transfers,
explaining complete sharing within boundaries. In this partition the size and location of islands,
and hence the set of agents who fully share each others’ shocks, is endogenous to the endowment
realization. This result diﬀerentiates our model from group-based theories of risk-sharing, where
insurance groups are determined exogenously and do not vary with the realization of uncertainty.
One implication of the islands result is that risk-sharing in networks is local. The intuition
is straightforward: because risk-sharing islands are connected subgraphs, agents who are socially
closer are more likely to belong to the same island, and hence insure each other more. This
observation helps characterize the mechanics of informal insurance as a function of shock size.
Risk-sharing works well for relatively small shocks, because both direct and indirect friends help
out. As the size of the shock increases, only a selected group of close friends help shoulder the
additional burden; and risk-sharing completely breaks down for large shocks. This prediction
can be used to test our model against other theories of limited risk-sharing, which do not imply
diﬀerences in partial risk-sharing as a function of network distance.
In current work, we are exploring the interaction between government policies and network-
based insurance by simulating the eﬀects of a hypothetical development aid program using network
data from Peru. Aid programs where some agents receive government transfers are common in
the developing world (e.g., Progresa in Mexico). In our model, part of this aid will be transferred
by informal arrangements through the network and therefore also aﬀects the consumption of the
non-treated, consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2007). Simulations
allow us to better understand the mechanics of aid spillovers. We expect that the identities of the
treated can matter for the overall impact of the program: well-connected individuals are better at
allocating resources to those who need them most. Identifying observable demographic correlates
such as gender or education that help targeting aid to these individuals can have implications for
the optimal design of development aid.
Our work builds on recent theories of informal contracting where the network structure is
explicitly modelled. The paper most closely related to ours is Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2005),
who build a model of informal insurance in social networks where agents face both informational
and commitment constraints. Their main result is a characterization of network structures that
are stable under certain exogenously speciﬁed risk-sharing arrangements. We conduct the opposite
3investigation: taking the network as exogenous, we study the degree and structure of informal risk-
sharing. Bramoulle and Kranton (2006) and Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) also study insurance
arrangements in networks, but in their models there are no enforcement constraints. Mobius and
Szeidl (2007) explore informal borrowing in networks with a model related to ours, and Dixit
(2003) analyses the trade-oﬀ between relational and formal governance when agents are organized
in a circle network.1
Empirical research on insurance in networks includes Dercon and Weerdt (2006), Fafchamps and
Lund (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), who use data on village networks, while Mazzocco
(2007) emphasizes the role of within caste-transfers. We also build on the inﬂuential early work of
Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994) on limited risk-sharing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents our model of informal
insurance in networks. Section 2 characterizes the limits to risk-sharing, and Section 3 analyses
constrained eﬃcient arrangements. We discuss brieﬂy our current work on the indirect eﬀects of
development aid in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
1 A model of risk-sharing in the network
1.1 Setup
The basic logic of our model is the following. We consider an economy where agents face endowment
risk and have no access to formal insurance markets. To reduce their risk exposure, agents agree
on an informal risk-sharing arrangement, which is a set of state-contingent transfers to be paid
after the realization of uncertainty. These transfer payments are used to implement risk-sharing by
compensating those who experience bad shocks. The informal contract is enforced by the threat
of social sanctions: agents keep their promises because failure to make a transfer payment leads to
losing a valuable friend in the network.
More formally, consider a social network G =( W, L) where W is the set of agents (vertices)
and L is the set of links (edges) between agents. Each link in the network represents a friendship
or business relationship. The strength of an (i,j) relationship is exogenous, and is denoted by
1More broadly, our paper is related to the literature on informal contracting in repeated interactions. Ligon
(1998), Coate and Ravaillon (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) develop models of
consumption insurance with limited commitment, but do not study the eﬀects of network structure. In earlier work,
Kandori (1992), Greif (1993) and Ellison (1994) study community enforcement, and Kranton (1996) analyses the
interaction between relational and formal markets.
4c(i,j) ≥ 0,w h e r ew ec a l lc the capacity function. For ease of presentation, we assume that friendship
is symmetric, so that c(i,j)=c(j,i) for all i and j agents.2 We think about the capacity c(i,j) as
a measure of the beneﬁtt h a ti derives from his relationship with j. These beneﬁts can represent
the direct utility that agents enjoy when they are in a social relationship, or the utility or monetary
value of economic interaction in the present or in future periods.
Prior to the realization of uncertainty, agents agree on a transfer arrangement, which is a set
of state-contingent transfer payments tij.H e r e tij is the net transfer from agent i to agent j,t o
be delivered after the endowment shocks are realized. For now, we do not model how the particu-
lar transfer arrangement is chosen. Next, nature moves, and each agent i receives an endowment
realization ei, where the vector of endowments (ei) is drawn from a commonly know joint dis-
tribution. We assume that agents fully observe the endowments of others, eﬀectively ruling out
information-based reasons for limited risk-sharing.
After observing the endowments, agents can send transfers to each other. Let e tij be the net
transfer sent by agent i to agent j;b yd e ﬁnition, e tij = −e tji. Whenever an agent i chooses to transfer
ad i ﬀerent amount from what he had promised to pay, e tij 6= tij, he loses his friendship link with
j.3 Loss of a friendship is costly, because friends generate utility value: it is this social sanction
that provides incentives to agents to keep their promises. Formally, at the end of the game, agents
derive utility from two sources: goods consumption and friendship. Denoting xi = ei −
P
j e tij the
total goods consumption of i and ci =
P
j e c(i,j) his total remaining friendships, his realized utility
is Ui (xi,c i),w h e r eUi is a smooth, increasing and concave utility function. The ex ante expected
payoﬀ of i is then EUi (xi,c i), where the expectation is taken over the realizations of endowment
shocks.
1.2 Discussion of modelling assumptions
The two main ingredients in the model are the concept of transfer arrangements and the speciﬁcation
of social sanctions. Transfer arrangements can represent social customs and norms that have
d e v e l o p e di nag i v e nc o m m u n i t y ,a sw e l la sm o r ee x p licit informal agreements. While the promised
transfer payments tij are measured in dollar terms, they may also stand for transfers in kind, such
2We emphasize that this assumption is made for presentational purposes only. All our results extend to the case
with asymmtric capacities.
3Such punishments may be less realistic when the value of the link to agent j is high, and the diﬀerence between
the promised and actual transfer is small. However, the analysis in the paper is unaﬀected if we assume that making
a lower than promised transfer results in a partial loss of friendship, high enough to make the deviation suboptimal.
That is, the “punishment” can be in proportion with the “crime”, without aﬀecting our results.
5as gifts of goods and services.
In this model, we formalize social sanctions by assuming that when an agent fails to make a
promised transfer, the associated link is automatically lost. This loss of friendship captures the
idea that friendly feelings may cease to exist if a promise is broken. It is possible to provide precise
microfoundations for such behavior: Failure to make a transfer might signal that an agent no
longer values a particular friendship, in which case the former friends might ﬁnd it optimal not to
interact with each other in the future. Mobius and Szeidl (2007) develop this idea formally. It is
also possible that people break a link because of emotional or instinctive reasons in response to
cheating: Fehr and Gachter (2000) provide evidence for such behavior.
One can imagine other social sanctions as well: for example, a deviating agent could be punished
by all his friends, or by all agents in the community. Because these sanctions are stronger, we expect
that they implement better risk-sharing than what can be obtained in our model. By modelling
sanctions at the level of network connections, we essentially assume that in the event when a
relationship goes bad, outsiders cannot assign the blame: they do not learn who broke a promise.
This assumption is particularly realistic if relationships can go bad for reasons not connected to
risk-sharing arrangements as well, such as personal conﬂicts.
Two important aspects of relational contracting in practice are repeated interactions and asym-
metric information about endowments. While our model setup is a static one, we emphasize that
it can also be interpreted as a “snapshot” of a more fully dynamic model, where the value of a
network connection derives in part from the ability to conduct transactions through the link in the
future. In any ﬁxed period, conditional on the endogenous link values the dynamic model reduces
to our current setup with quasi-linear utility: Ui(xi,c i)=ui(xi)+ci,w h e r eci is the continuation
value from future relationships.4 Since our static analysis applies for any set of capacities, it follows
that our results about risk-sharing in networks extend to the dynamic model as well. We plan to
analyze the dynamics of risk-sharing more explicitly in future work.
Agents in our model perfectly observe each other’s endowment shocks, and hence we have no
information-based limits to insurance. Thus our results can be interpreted as a benchmark about
the importance of limited commitment in explaining imperfect risk-sharing. Moreover, our full
4In dynamic settings it may be unrealistic to expect that ci =
S
j6=i c(i,j), i.e., the continuation value from keeping
all links is equal to the sum of continuation values of individual links. However, our analysis remains valid as long as
in the underlying dynamic model it is suﬃcient to consider deviations that involve withholding only one transfer. To
see this, note that if ci is the continuation value of i if all his links survive the current round and c
0
i is his continuation
value if he loses the link with j,t h e nc(i,j) can deﬁned to be ci − c
0
i. In this case, while ci =
S
j6=i c(i,j) is not
necessarrily true, we can still verify incentive compatibility based on link-speciﬁc capacity values c(i,j). This one-link
deviation property holds for all settings where the value of a link for an agent increases if he loses other links.
6information assumption seems reasonable in the village environments that we are most interested
in, where individuals can easily observe important economic attributes like the state of livestock
or crops. This view is also supported by Udry (1994), who shows that asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders is relatively unimportant in villages in Northern Nigeria. This is
not to say that asymmetric information is irrelevant for consumption insurance in general: the
costs of observability rapidly increase with distance, and hence asymmetric information may be an
important limitation to cross-village risk-sharing.
1.3 Incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements
We focus on allocations that can be implemented using arrangements where agents always ﬁnd it
optimal to keep their promises ex post. This leads to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 A risk-sharing arrangement t is incentive compatible (IC for short) if
Ui (xi,c i) ≥ Ui (xi + tij,c i − c(i,j)) (1)
for all i and j, for all realizations of uncertainty.
Intuitively, agent i must prefer to keep his friendship with j to defaulting on the promised
transfer payment of tij.I t i s e a s y t o s e e t h a t i f i does not ﬁnd it optimal do default on a single
transfer, he will also prefer not to default on a set of transfers: this follows from the quasi-concavity
of the isoquants of Ui. Restricting our attention to IC arrangements does not reduce the set of
feasible payoﬀs: For every non-IC arrangement t, we can construct an alternative IC arrangement t0
by replacing t with a zero promised transfer in whenever it is optimal to default. This arrangement
implements the same transfer payments as t, but no agent ever defaults, and hence utility is weakly
improved.
Perfect substitutes. Our expected utility speciﬁcation admits a useful special case when goods
and friends are perfect substitutes,i . e . ,w h e nUi (xi,c i)=ui (xi + ci). Here a unit increase in
the total capacity of friends is equivalent to a unit increase in goods consumption, and hence
the value of friends is ﬁxed in dollar terms. This case arises naturally when link values come from
contemporaneous economic interactions that have an associated surplus measured in dollars. When
goods and friendship are perfect substitutes, the incentive compatibility condition (1) simpliﬁes
7considerably: a transfer arrangement is IC if and only if
tij ≤ c(i,j) (2)
holds for all i and j. This condition means that the transfer amount can never exceed the capacity
of a link: agent i cannot credibly commit to paying more to j than the value of their friendship.
The simplicity and transparency of (2) makes this setting highly tractable. Because of this, we pay
particular attention to the perfect substitutes case in the subsequent analysis, while highlighting
how our results extend to general utility functions.
A key tool in extending our results to the imperfect substitutes case is a pair of necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for incentive compatibility with general utility functions. To derive these
conditions, deﬁne the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between good and friendship consump-
tion as MRSi =( ∂Ui/∂ci)/(∂Ui/∂xi). We say that the MRS is uniformly bounded if there exist
constants k<Ksuch that k ≤ MRSi ≤ K for all i, xi and ci. It is easy to see that when the
MRS is uniformly bounded, then (i) any IC arrangement must satisfy tij ≤ K ·c(i,j),a n d(ii) any
arrangement that satisﬁes tij ≤ k ·c(i,j) must be IC. The intuition can be seen by noting that the
MRS measures the relative price of goods and friendship. If this relative price is always between
k and K, then a transfer exceeding Kc(i,j) is always worth more than the link and hence never
IC, but a transfer below kc(i,j) i sa l w a y sw o r t hl e s st h a nt h el i n ka n dh e n c ei sI C .I nt h ep e r f e c t
substitutes case, MRSi =1 ,s ow ec a ns e tk = K =1 , which yields (2).
2 The limits to risk-sharing
Our goal in this section is to characterize the degree of risk-sharing that obtains in a given social
network. The central theme in the analysis is that good risk-sharing requires networks to have
good expansion properties; that is, all groups of agents should have enough connections with the
rest of the network, relative to group size. The intuition is simple: these connections allow every
subset of agents to oﬀ-load their idiosyncratic shocks to the rest of the community. For most of the
analysis, we assume that goods and friendship are perfect substitutes; we discuss how to extend
the results to general utility functions at the end of the section.
82.1 An implementation result
We begin by looking at the problem of implementing a consumption proﬁle in a ﬁxed endowment
realization. This will be helpful when we study the implementation problem under uncertainty
later. To gain some intuition, consider the inﬁnite line network depicted in Figure 2a, where all
link capacities are equal to some ﬁxed number c,a n dl e tF be a group of four consecutive agents.
Suppose that the total endowment of these four agents is eF =
P
i∈F ei, and that our goal is
to implement a proﬁle (xi) where their total consumption is xF =
P
i∈F xi.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
the group F as a whole must receive a transfer of xF − eF from the rest of the network. This
transfer can only ﬂow through the two links at the endpoints of the interval F; hence incentive
compatibility requires that the capacity of these two links, 2c, is greater than or equal to the total
demand for resources, i.e., 2c ≥ xF −eF. To extend this logic for arbitrary sets of agents, we deﬁne
the “perimeter” of a set of agents F ⊆ W to be c[F]=
P
i∈F, j/ ∈F c(i,j).
Theorem 1 Given endowment realization (ei), consumption proﬁle (xi) can be implemented with
an IC arrangement if and only if (i) the resource constraint xW = eW holds, and (ii) for all sets
|F| ≤ N/2,
xF − eF ≤ c[F]. (3)
Since W is the set of all agents, the constraint xW = eW simply means that the target allocation
uses all available endowment. The key part of the Theorem is the set of bounds (3). We have already
established that these bounds are necessary: the excess demand xF − eF must ﬂow through the
perimeter c[F]. The surprising part of the theorem is that they are also suﬃcient. This result
makes use of the mathematical theory of network ﬂows, and in particular a corollary of the Ford
and Fulkerson (1956) maximum ﬂow - minimum cut theorem. To understand the basic idea, note
that the maximum ﬂow between vertices s and t in a graph is deﬁned as the highest amount that
can ﬂow from s to t along the edges respecting the capacity constraints given by link values. Ford
and Fulkerson show that the value of the maximum ﬂow equals the value of the minimum cut, i.e.,
the smallest capacity that has to be deleted such that s and t e n du pi nd i ﬀerent components. To
apply this result here, we add two hypothetical agents s and t to the network G and transform the
implementation problem into a ﬂow problem such that implementing proﬁle (x) is equivalent to
ﬁnding a large enough ﬂow between s and t. Every cut in this transformed problem corresponds
to the perimeter of some set F in the original network, and hence the desired ﬂow exists if all cuts
are large enough, which is exactly condition (3).
92.2 The limits to full risk-sharing
Theorem 1 can be used to characterize the networks that allow Pareto-optimal full risk-sharing.
To understand the logic, consider the three inﬁnite networks depicted in Figure 2, where all link
capacities are equal to some number c. Let the endowment shocks be independent binary random
variables, so that for each agent i, ei is either σ or −σ with equal probabilities.
Can equal sharing be implemented in these examples? The law of large numbers implies that
the average endowment is almost surely zero, hence equal sharing implies all agents consuming zero
almost surely. Consider ﬁrst the “line” network in Figure 2a. Select an “interval set” F:s i n c e
endowment shocks are i.i.d., with positive probability all agents in F receive a negative income
shock of −σ. Because all these agents must consume zero, Theorem 1 implies that 2c ≥ |F|·σ has
to hold for every F.B u tf o ra n yﬁxed value of c,w ec a nﬁnd a long enough interval that violates
this inequality; as a result, full risk-sharing cannot be implemented on the line. A similar negative
result holds for the 2-dimensional “plane” network in Figure 2b. The perimeter of a square-shaped
set F in this network is 4c ·| F|
1/2, which is smaller than |F| for a large square; hence in the event
where all agents in F get a negative shock, equal sharing must fail. However, this argument does
not rule out equal sharing for the inﬁnite “binary tree” network in Figure 2c. Here, the perimeter
of any set F is at least σ ·| F|,a n ds of o rc>σ , the transfers required for equal sharing can ﬂow
into any set F in any endowment realization.
The above examples suggest that the perimeter relative to the size of certain sets F governs
whether full risk-sharing can be implemented. To formalize this intuition, we ﬁrst introduce some
notation. Let a[F]=c[F]/|F| be the “perimeter-to-area ratio” of F, where the “area” is simply the
number of agents in F,a n dl e tσ =m i n i σi denote the minimum standard deviation of endowment
shocks in the network. We say that endowments have a product support if for all i, the support of ei
given any realization of (e−i) is the same as its unconditional support. This is a weak assumption,
ensuring that there is some idiosyncratic component in each agent’s endowment shock.5
Proposition 1 [Limits to full risk-sharing]
(i) Suppose endowments have a product support. If a[F] <σ for some F with |F| ≤ N/2,t h e n
no IC allocation implements equal sharing.
(ii) Suppose shocks are symmetric binary, with eW =0 .I fa[F] ≥ σ for all F with |F| ≤ N/2,
then there exists an IC allocation implementing equal sharing.
5Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2006) impose a similar condition on endowment shocks in their Assumption 1.
10Part (i) states that when the perimeter/area ratio of at least one set is smaller than the measure
of endowment risk σ, then full risk-sharing cannot be implemented. The intuition is simple: by the
product support assumption, there are realizations where the cumulative idiosyncratic shock inside
F is larger than the perimeter. This shock cannot be completely transferred away, and hence equal
sharing must fail. Part (ii) is a partial converse for symmetric binary shocks and no aggregate
uncertainty. This result follows directly from Theorem 1. When eW =0 , equal sharing means that
all agents must consume zero. Given that shocks are binary, any set F has an excess demand of at
most |F|·σ relative to the target of zero consumption. This demand is less than or equal to the
perimeter c[F] because a[F] ≥ σ, and hence can be satisﬁed for all sets F.
The proposition shows that full risk-sharing imposes very strong expansion conditions on the
network structure, which are unlikely to be satisﬁed in real-world networks. In fact, since social
networks in practice are often organized on the basis of geographic location, we expect that their
structure more closely resembles the 2-dimensional grid on the plane. For these networks, full
risk-sharing fails by part (i) of the Proposition, and hence we need to explore the degree of partial
risk-sharing that might obtain.
2.3 Partial risk-sharing
We begin our analysis of partial risk-sharing with an intuitive argument. Assume that our goal is to
implement a proﬁle where all agents consume zero. We know from Theorem 1 that the cumulative
shock in a set F can leave the set in a realization if eF ≤ c[F]. This result suggests that risk-sharing
should be reasonably good when eF ≤ c[F] holds “most of the time.” This will be the case for
example when σF =stdev[eF] is small relative to c[F], because the standard deviation is a measure
of the “typical magnitude” of eF. This logic suggests that we might expect good but imperfect
risk-sharing if c[F] is suﬃciently larger than σF for most sets F.
Note, there is an important diﬀerence between this argument and the results in Proposition 1.
In the Proposition, the perimeter/area ratio is compared to the standard deviation of individual
endowment shocks, and hence the correlation structure across agents is not exploited. Here, we
make use of the correlation structure by computing the standard deviation over sets of agents. To
see why this matters, note that full risk-sharing as characterized by Proposition 1 requires c[F]
to be proportional to |F|. But if endowment shocks are i.i.d., then the standard deviation of eF
is only of order |F|
1/2, and hence our argument suggests that good risk-sharing can obtain even if
the perimeter is of order |F|
1/2, which can be much smaller than |F|. In particular, for the plane
11network, where the perimeter of square shape sets is c[F] ∼ |F|
1/2, this logic suggests reasonably
good risk-sharing. In contrast, for the line we still expect risk-sharing to be poor, because the
p e r i m e t e ro fl o n gi n t e r v a ls e t sw i l lb es m a l l e rt h a n|F|
1/2.
To formalize this intuition, we need to develop a measure of partial risk-sharing. Using the
equal sharing proﬁle where all agents consume e =( 1 /N)
P
i ei as the full risk-sharing benchmark,







{U (e) − U (xi)}
where we ignored the dependence of utility on links to simplify notation. UDISP, or “utility-based
dispersion,” is simply the diﬀerence between average expected utility in the allocation (x) relative
to the ﬁrst best of equal sharing, and hence lower values correspond to better risk-sharing. In
particular, UDISP(x) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if x implements equal sharing. If all agents












which is the square-root of the expected cross-sectional variance of x. For non-quadratic utilities,
SDISP (x) can be interpreted as a second order approximation of the utility based measure.
SDISP is highly tractable, and inherits the intuitive properties of UDISP: it is zero only in equal
sharing and positive otherwise, and its magnitude measures the departure from equal sharing: e.g.,
if eu are symmetric binary, then in autarky SDISP (e)=σ. For these reasons, we concentrate on
SDISP in the analysis below.
Before stating the formal results, we make some assumptions about the distribution of shocks.
We assume that the source of uncertainty is a collection of independent random variables yj,
j =1 ,...,∞, which can represent idiosyncratic shocks like illness as well as aggregate shocks like
weather. Diﬀerent agents may have diﬀerent exposure to these shocks, so that ei =
P
j αijyj.where




bounded for all agents, and that yj have uniformly bounded support.6 One natural special case
is when ei = yi are i.i.d. We also require that shocks are not too correlated, so that aggregate
uncertainty disappears at a rate σF ≤ K1 ·|F|
1/2 with some K1 > 0. On the line or the plane, this
6This assumption can be relaxed: we only require bounds on the moment-generating function of yj.N o r m a l l y
distributed random variables also satisfy these bounds, and hence all our results extend to joinly normal shocks.
12property holds for example when the correlation between endowment shocks decays geometrically
with network distance. Finally, we assume that a larger group of people face more risk, so that for
all G ⊆ F,w eh a v eσG ≤ σF; and that sharing risk with more people is always good, i.e., that for
all G ⊆ F,w eh a v eσF/|F| ≤ σG/|G|.
Proposition 2 Under the above conditions, there exist K and K0 constants such that
(i) On the line with capacities c and i.i.d. shocks, we have SDISP (x) ≥ K/c for all IC
arrangements (x).
(ii) On the plane with capacities c, we have SDISP (x) ≤ exp
£
−K0c2/3¤
for some IC arrange-
ment (x).
This proposition formalizes our earlier intuition by comparing the rate of convergence to full risk-
sharing as we increase capacities, between the line and plane networks.7 Intuitively, this criterion
examines the eﬀectiveness of strengthening the existing links in the network. For the line we expect
poor risk-sharing, because the size of shocks grows faster than the perimeter of sets. Formally,
this means that SDISP goes to zero at a slow rate of 1/c as c goes to inﬁnity. But for the plane,
we expect very good risk-sharing because the perimeter has the same order of magnitude as the
standard deviation of the shock; as a result, SDISP should go to zero at a fast, exponential rate.
Risk-sharing on the plane is thus qualitatively diﬀerent from risk-sharing on the line: convergence
to equal sharing is exponential as opposed to polynomial.
Numerical simulations suggest that the asymptotic results of the Proposition are good de-
scriptions of behavior for ﬁnite c as well. To take one example, consider Figure 3, which shows
constrained optimal allocations for ﬁnite line and plane networks with unit capacities, for a given
realization of binary shocks with σ =1 .8 For both the line and the plane, the black-and-white
panel shows the endowment realization, while the grey panel shows the optimal allocation that
can be implemented with IC transfers. The ﬁgures represent typical endowment realizations: they
were randomly drawn, and we have played around with many realizations. The contrast between
the line and the plane is remarkable: for the line, we see substantial color variation in the grey
panel, reﬂecting imperfect risk-sharing (SDISP = 31%); but for the plane, equal sharing can be
implemented in this particular realization (SDISP =0 ).
The proof of the proposition works the following way. For part (i), we split the line into equal
7It can be shown that under mild conditions on the distribution of endowments, for any connected network SDISP
c o n v e r g e st oz e r oa st h ec a p a c i t i e so fl i n k sg ot oi n ﬁnity.
8In these simulations, the line network is a segment, and the plane network is a square.
13interval sets, and show that for long intervals, much of the shock over each interval must remain
inside the set. We choose intervals of approximate length 16c2, which implies that σF for each
interval is on the order of
¡
16c2¢1/2 =4 c. Since the perimeter of each interval is 2c, a standard
deviation of 4c − 2c =2 c must remain in each of these sets. If agents in a set manage to smooth
this residual shock perfectly, then the per capita residual standard deviation will be 2c/|F| ∼ 1/c,
establishing the desired lower bound.
The result for the plane is more diﬃcult. Here, we have to construct an IC arrangement that
implements very good risk-sharing. We do this in two steps: ﬁrst we construct an “unconstrained”
arrangement that implements equal sharing on a 2m by 2m sized square for some m chosen as a
function of c; second, we show that this unconstrained arrangement violates capacity constraints
infrequently, and hence there exists an IC arrangement that implements almost as good risk-sharing
as the unconstrained one. For the unconstrained arrangement, we make use of a partition of the
network where we split the square of size 2m by 2m into four equal squares, split each of these
into four smaller squares, and repeat this procedure m times. Then we build the unconstrained
ﬂow from the bottom up: ﬁr s tw es m o o t hc o n s u m p t i o ni nt h es m a l l e s ts q u a r e s ,t h e nw es m o o t h
consumption in the squares at the next level, and so on. There are m steps in this procedure, and
hence each link is used only m times. Assuming that σ =1 , every time a link is used, the required
capacity is of order 1, because the standard deviation in a square F is σF = |F|
1/2,a n dt h i sm u s tb e
distributed over the 4 ·| F|
1/2 links on the perimeter. Thus with m iterations, we implement equal
sharing in the big square while only using a link capacity of order m on average. Equal sharing in
the big square corresponds to an SDISP of order e−m, thus a choice of m = c would implement
exponentially good risk-sharing. However, we have to worry about the exceptional events when
the capacity constraints are violated. Using the theory of large deviations we prove that these
exceptional events can be taken care of with a choice of m = c2/3, resulting in the bound of the
proposition.
2.4 Geographic networks
The results for the plane are interesting because real-world networks are likely to be similarly two-
dimensional. To formalize this idea, suppose that the social network can be represented by a map
on the plane. If the correlation between agents’ endowment shocks falls fast enough with distance
on the map, then we expect that σF grows at the rate of |F|
1/2, just like in the plane network.
Moreover, if agents tend to have friends at close geographic distance in multiple directions, then
14it is plausible that that the perimeter of sets F also grows at a rate of |F|
1/2. These observations
suggest that the key properties of the plane are preserved for a wider class of geographic networks,
and hence we expect good risk-sharing for them.
To make this argument precise, consider an inﬁnite network, and let π : W → R2 map agents
in this network to locations in the plane such that diﬀerent agents are assigned diﬀerent locations.
To ensure that agents have friends in multiple directions, consider two a by a squares on the plane
sharing a common side, with sides parallel to the axes, and deﬁne the crossing density as the
total capacity of all links connecting agents in one square with agents in the other, normalized
by a. We say that the embedding exhibits no separating avenues if the crossing density of all
large enough squares is bounded away from zero. If this holds, then agents in a large square
always have friends in neighboring squares. We also assume that for large squares, the part of
the network that falls into a square is connected; and that the population density in all large
enough squares is bounded from above and below. Regarding the endowment shocks, we require
that the correlation between individual endowments falls geometrically with distance, i.e., that
corr[ei,e j] ≤ K2 exp[−d(i,j)/K2] for some K2 > 0,w h e r ed(u,v) is the Euclidean distance between
π(u) and π(v). A network is called a geographic network if these conditions are satisﬁed.
Corollary 1 In geographic networks, we have SDISP (x) ≤ exp
£
−K0c2/3¤
for some IC arrange-
ment (x).
The proof combines Proposition 2 with a renormalization argument. We take a geographic
network, and superimpose on its planar representation a grid with large squares. Then we merge
all people within each square to create a new network. Because of the no separating avenues
condition, this new network is essentially a plane, and hence Proposition 2 (ii) can be applied to
yield a bound for SDISP of the new network. We thin lift this bound back to the old network
using the assumptions of bounded population density and connectedness inside the squares.
The Corollary is useful because it can help explain stylized facts in development economics.
Real-world village networks are likely to be organized partly on a geographic basis, and hence are
likely to satisfy the properties of a geographic network. As a result, our model predicts very good
informal risk-sharing in these villages, which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Townsend
(1994), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), Mazzocco (2007) and others.
152.5 Risk-sharing ability of a group
One commonly used approach to test full risk-sharing in the data is to regress the consumption of
an individual or a group on their own endowment shock as well as a community-wide shock. A
variant of this regression when there is no aggregate uncertainty is
xF = α + β · eF + ε
where consumption in F is regressed on the endowment shock speciﬁct oF.I t i s e a s y t o s e e
that with full risk-sharing, we get βF =0 ; this corresponds to the test of full risk-sharing used
in Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Townsend (1994) and others. When β 6=0 ,f u l lr i s k - s h a r i n gi s
rejected; however, small magnitudes of the coeﬃcient can be interpreted to mean that agents in F
share their risk with the rest of the community reasonably well. The following result supports this
interpretation.





The regression coeﬃcient β has a lower bound which is a function of the perimeter c[F] relative
to the standard deviation of the community-speciﬁcs h o c kσF. The intuition is familiar: when the
perimeter of a set is small, there is insuﬃcient capacity for the shock to exit, which yields high
correlation between consumption and shocks. The proposition is related to the empirical ﬁndings
in Townsend (1994), who shows that there is considerable risk-sharing among households within an
Indian village, but only limited sharing of village-speciﬁc shocks across villages. The proposition
is consistent with these ﬁndings if cross-village network ties are weak relative to the size of the
villages.
2.6 The limits to risk-sharing with imperfect substitutes
We now discuss brieﬂy how the results in this section extend to the imperfect substitutes case.
We ﬁnd that all results extend, but the upper and lower bounds on risk-sharing are weakened
by constant factors that depend on the degree of substitutability between goods and friendship.
Since the results about partial risk-sharing characterize limit behavior, they remain unaﬀected by
these constant factors. To obtain our extensions, we assume that the marginal rate of substitution
16(MRS) is uniformly bounded: k<M R S i <Kfor all agents i in the relevant range of endowment
realizations.
We begin with extending Theorem 1. When the MRS is bounded, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition in the Theorem is replaced by the following two conditions, one being necessary, the other
suﬃcient for IC implementation. (i) Any IC proﬁle must satisfy xF − eF ≤ K · c[F] for all sets F
with |F| ≤ N/2.( ii) Ap r o ﬁle that satisﬁes xF −eF ≤ k ·c[F] for all F with |F| ≤ N/2 is IC. The
extension follows directly from the logic of Theorem 1, noting that bounded MRS implies that the
relative price of friendship and goods is always between k and K. This extension is particularly
informative for environments where k and K are close to each other, e.g., when endowment shocks
have a small support: then, by continuity, the MRS does not vary much in the relevant range of
realizations.
The uniform bound on the MRS can also be used to extend the characterization of environments
where full risk-sharing can be implemented. We continue to ﬁnd that the ﬁr s t - b e s tc a no n l yb e
achieved in expander graphs where the perimeter/area ratio is bounded from below: we require
a[F] ≥ σ/K.W ea l s oﬁnd that in the binary shock case, full risk-sharing can be implemented when
a[F] ≥ σ/k. These results imply that full risk-sharing fails for most plausible networks even with
imperfect substitutes. Our ﬁndings about partial risk-sharing characterize convergence rates, and
hence they extend without modiﬁcation to the imperfect substitutes case. In particular, SDISP
continues to converge exponentially for geographic networks, and therefore our argument about
good risk-sharing in real-world networks is unaﬀected.
T h es e t u pw h e r eg o o d sa n df r i e n d s h i pa r ei m p e r f ect substitutes yields some additional impli-
cations as well. If the marginal rate of substitution between goods and friendship is increasing in
consumption, then agents with low consumption value their friends less, reducing the maximum
amount they are willing to transfer to them. As a result, if in a society that experiences a neg-
ative aggregate shock, the scope for insuring idiosyncratic risk is reduced because of the drop in
the dollar value of links. We formalize this intuition in the appendix by showing that when the
MRS is increasing, reducing the endowments of all agents results in a smaller set of IC transfer
arrangements. In particular, SDISP is larger after a negative aggregate shock, because agents
are more constrained in insuring idiosyncratic risk. These results are consistent with the ﬁndings
of Kazianga and Udry (2006), who document that during the severe draught of 1981-85 in rural
Burkina Faso, risk-sharing between households was quite limited.
173C o n s t r a i n e d e ﬃcient risk-sharing
In this section, we study allocations that are optimal subject to the enforcement constraints imposed
by the network. A risk-sharing arrangement is constrained eﬃcient or second-best if it is Pareto-
optimal among the set of IC arrangements. Constrained eﬃcient arrangements provide a natural
benchmark, because they achieve the highest possible level of risk-sharing in a given social network.
In addition, we show below that constrained eﬃciency can arise both when agents follow simple
rules of thumb for helping each other, and also as a result of dynamic coalitional bargaining. Once
reached, constrained eﬃcient arrangements are likely to remain stable, because they are robust to
both individual and coalitional deviations.
As in the previous section, we start out by assuming that goods and friendship and perfect
substitutes, and extend the results to general preferences later.
3.1 Characterizing constrained eﬃciency
In this subsection we maintain the assumption that goods and friendship are perfect substitutes.
The study of second-best arrangements is facilitated by the fact that they can be characterized using
a planner’s problem. Formally, let (λi)i∈W be a set of positive weights, and deﬁne the planner’s




λi · EUi (xi,c i) (5)
subject to the IC-constraint (1). We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Every constrained eﬃcient arrangement is the solution to a planner’s problem
with some set of weights (λi). Conversely, any solution to the planner’s problem is constrained
eﬃcient.
Wilson (1968) establishes a similar equivalence result for risk-sharing in syndicates. His proof
builds on the idea that the set of possible payoﬀ vectors is convex. Since an eﬃcient allocation must
lie on the boundary of this set, convexity implies the existence of a tangent hyperplane with some
normal vector (λi). Maximizing a planner’s problem with these (λi) weights will select the eﬃcient
allocation by design. Adapting this argument to our model requires that the set of IC payoﬀ vectors
be convex. In the perfect substitutes case, this follows easily: when two transfers satisfy a capacity
constraint, their convex combination will also satisfy it. As we detail in the Appendix, the result
18can also be extended to the imperfect substitutes case under an additional condition about the
curvature of the marginal rate of substitution.
Proposition 4 implies that maximizing the planner’s expected utility E
P
λiUi is equivalent
to maximizing realized utility
P
λiUi independently for each state, because conditional on the
planner weights, the states are not connected in the maximization problem. This separation of
states simpliﬁes the characterization of second-best arrangements, and makes it easier to solve
for them. In particular, we can derive a set of ﬁrst-order conditions for the planner’s problem
separately for each state, which allows for a simple characterization of second-best arrangements.
We say that a link from i to j i sb l o c k e di nag i v e nr e a l i z a t i o n ,i ftij = c(i,j),t h a ti s ,i fi is sending
the maximum IC amount.
Proposition 5 A transfer arrangement t is constrained eﬃcient iﬀ there exist positive welfare






j(xj) and the link from j to i is blocked
3) λiU0
i(xi) <λ jU0
j(xj) and the link from i to j is blocked.
This result states the set of ﬁrst order necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the planner’s
problem. To understand the intuition, recall that as Wilson (1968) has shown, unconstrained
Pareto optimal risk-sharing implies that λiU0
i(xi)=λjU0
i(xj) for all i and j. If this condition is
violated, e.g., λiU0
i(xi) <λ jU0
j(xj), then the planner’s objective can be improved by transferring a
small amount from i to j. In a second best arrangement, this transfer must violate the incentive
compatibility constraint; as a result, the maximum possible amount most already be transferred
from i to j. This logic establishes the necessity of the above ﬁrst order conditions; suﬃciency follows
because the planner’s objective function is concave and the domain of IC consumption proﬁles is
convex. These conditions also guarantee uniqueness.
The Proposition also implies that for any pair of agents i and j,i fλiU0
i <λ jU0
j,t h e na l l
paths connecting i and j have to be blocked in the sense that at least one link along each path is
used at maximal capacity. This observation uncovers an important feature of constrained eﬃcient
agreements, namely that in any realization agents can be partitioned into connected “risk-sharing
islands” such that within an island agents share risk perfectly, while cross-island insurance is limited
because boundary links operate at full capacity.
19Proposition 6 [Risk-sharing islands] In any realization (ei) the set of agents can be partitioned
into connected components Wk such that for i,j ∈ Wk we have λiU0
i = λjU0
j and for i ∈ Wk,a n d
j/ ∈ Wk either tij = c(i,j) or tji = c(j,i).
The sharing island Wk of i is the maximal connected set containing i with the property that
λiU0
i = λjU0
j for all j ∈ Wk. For each realization, these sharing islands provide a partition of the
network, and have the property that shocks are fully shared within an island but there is imperfect
insurance across islands. This island structure is illustrated in the line network in Figure 3, where
the grey panel depicts the constrained eﬃcient allocation corresponding to equal planner weights
in one endowment realization. The dashed lines in the ﬁgure indicate the boundaries of the islands;
marginal utility and hence consumption is equalized within an island, but diﬀers across islands.
In the island partition, the size and location of islands, and hence the set of agents who fully share
each others’ shocks, is endogenous to the endowment realization. This result diﬀerentiates our model
from group-based theories of risk-sharing, where insurance groups are determined exogenously and
do not vary with the realization of uncertainty.
3.2 Spillover eﬀects and local sharing
The characterization of constrained eﬃcient allocations in terms of risk-sharing islands can be used
to explore the degree of partial insurance as a function of network distance. This analysis sheds
light on the spillover eﬀects of shocks in networks, and yields new testable implications about local
risk-sharing.
We begin by introducing a slightly stronger deﬁnition of risk-sharing islands. Fix an endowment
realization (ei),a n dl e tW (i) denote the sharing island containing i as deﬁned above, i.e., the
maximal connected set with the property that λiU0
i = λjU0
j for all j ∈ W (i).W e n o w d e ﬁne
c W(i) to be the maximal connected set of agents j such that there exists a path between i and j
along which no links are blocked in either direction. With this deﬁnition, c W(i) ⊂ W(i), because
the ﬁrst order condition of Proposition 5 implies λiU0
i = λjU0
i for all j ∈ c W(i). Moreover, except
for knife-edge cases when the transfer amount just reaches the capacity over a link but does not
“bind” yet, these two island deﬁnitions are equivalent, and c W(i)=W(i).I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t
these knife-edge cases happen with zero probability when the distribution of endowment shocks
is absolutely continuous; as a result, the two deﬁnitions can be treated as equivalent for practical
purposes.
20To understand the connection between partial risk-sharing and network distance, we explore
the eﬀects of an idiosyncratic shock to one agent’s endowment on the consumption of others. Fix a
constrained eﬃcient arrangement, and consider two endowment realizations e =( ei) and e0 =( e0
i),
where e0
j = ej for all j 6= i,a n de0
i <e i. These two realizations can be viewed either as agent
i experiencing an idiosyncratic negative shock in e0 relative to e,o ra sa g e n ti experiencing an
idiosyncratic positive shock (aid) in e relative to e0. For ease of exposition, in the discussions below
we focus on the ﬁrst interpretation: that agent i receives a negative shock in e0. We can measure







Here MUCj measures the marginal utility cost of the shock for agent j.Al a r g e rMUCj corresponds
to a higher increase in marginal utility and hence a greater consumption drop.9
Corollary 2 [Spillovers and local sharing]
(i) [Monotonicity] xj(e0) ≤ xj(e) for all j,a n di fj ∈ c W (i) then xj(e0) <x j(e).
(ii) [Local sharing] There exists ∆ > 0 such that |ei − e0
i| < ∆ implies MUCi = MUCj for all
j ∈ c W(i),a n dxj (e0)=xj (e) for all j ∈ W\W(i).
(iii) [More sharing with close friends] For any j 6= i, there exists a path i → j such that for any
agent l along the path, MUCl ≥ MUCj.
Part (i) shows that eﬃcient arrangements are monotone: If one agent receives a negative shock,
the consumption of everybody else either decreases or remains constant. Moreover, the agent
is partially insured by all others who are in the same risk-sharing island, who all reduce their
consumption by a positive amount. As a result, unless i is in a singleton island, he has access
to at least some insurance. The intuition follows from the deﬁnition of c W (i): links within the
risk-sharing island of i are not blocked, and hence a small transfer can ﬂow through them to help
out i. As part (ii) shows, for small shocks, the set of agents who insure i is exactly his sharing
island c W (i). All these agents share an equal burden of the shock, and hence experience the same
marginal utility cost. Agents outside of W (i) do not reduce their consumption at all; and in the
k n i f ee d g ec a s ew h e r ec W (i) 6= W (i), agents in W (i)\c W (i) may or may not share. Finally, part
(iii) shows how the utility cost of agents inr e s p o n s et oa ni d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c kt oi varies by social
9Analysing the impact of a positive iniosyncratic shock to i yields symmetric results.
21distance. The result states that indirect friends provide less insurance to i than direct friends: for
any agent j 6= i, there exists some direct friend of i,d e n o t e dl, who shares at least as much of the
burden of the shock as j does.
The results of the Corollary are also illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the marginal utility
cost of direct and indirect friends in response to an endowment shock to i. The horizontal axis is
the marginal utility cost of agent i himself, and the vertical axis measures the marginal utility cost
of some direct and indirect friends. For small shocks, both direct and indirect friends who are in
the same risk-sharing island as i help out. As the size of the shock grows, some indirect friends hit
their capacity constraints and stop reducing consumption, but some direct friends continue to help.
After a point, all direct friends hit their capacity constraints; as a result, additional increases in the
shock are fully borne by agent i. These implications can be used to test our model against other
theories of limited risk-sharing, which do not predict variation in the degree of partial risk-sharing
as a function of network distance.
3.3 Foundations for constrained eﬃciency
One reason for analyzing constrained eﬃcient allocations is that they naturally emerge from intu-
itive dynamic mechanisms among agents in the network. Here we brieﬂy discuss two such mecha-
nisms. First, constrained eﬃcient allocations can be obtained in a decentralized procedure where
agents use a simple rule of thumb in helping those who are in need. In every round of this dynamic
procedure, agents attempt to equate weighted marginal utilities between neighbors subject to the
capacity constraints: intuitively, people help out those friends and relatives who are in need. The
appendix shows that this procedure converges to the constrained eﬃcient allocation corresponding
to the welfare weights used. As a result, constrained eﬃcient allocations can emerge even if agents
only use local information: in every round of the procedure, agents engage in binary transactions
that only knowledge about the current resources of the two parties involved.10
A second mechanism that leads to constrained eﬃcient arrangements is collective dynamic
bargaining with renegotiation. Gomes (2005) shows that when agents can propose renegotiable
arrangements to subgroups and make side-payments in a dynamic bargaining procedure, as the
community become inﬁnitely patient, a Pareto-eﬃcient arrangement will be selected.11 This result
can be incorporated in our model by assuming that there is a negotiations phase prior to the
10Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) use a similar procedure with equal welfare weights and no capacity constraints.
11Aghion, Antras, and Helpman (2007) establish a similar result in a model involving renegotiating free-trade
agreements.
22endowment realization, and would imply that agents select a constrained eﬃcient risk-sharing
arrangement.
Finally, constrained eﬃcient arrangements are quite stable in our model, because they are robust
to all possible coalitional deviations. The appendix shows that after any endowment realization,
no group of agents can have a credible and proﬁtable deviation that involves IC transfers among
members of the group, and possibly reneging on some of the transfers to agents outside the group.
3.4 General preferences
We now turn to discuss how our results about constrained eﬃciency extend to the imperfect sub-
stitutes case. We ﬁnd that all our conceptual results generalize. The formal results are provided in
the Appendix; here we present an intuitive summary.
The key novelty with imperfect substitutes is that changing the goods consumption of an agent
aﬀects the agent’s link values, and hence his incentive compatibility constraints over transfers.
To characterize constrained eﬃciency in this environment, we assume that the marginal rate of
substitution MRSi, i.e., the relative price of friendship in terms of goods consumption, is concave
in xi. Intuitively, this means that increases in goods consumption have a diminishing eﬀect on the
value of friendship. When this condition holds, we can generalize Proposition 4, establishing the
equivalence between constrained eﬃciency and the planner’s problem.
To develop ﬁrst order conditions, we next analyze the eﬀect of an additional dollar to agent i on
the planner’s objective. With imperfect substitutes, this marginal welfare gain is no longer equal
to λi times his marginal utility of i’s consumption, because increased consumption also softens
i’s IC constraints over transfers to neighboring agents. As a result, it may be optimal from the
planner’s perspective to transfer some of the original dollar to such neighboring agents with whom
t h eI Cc o n s t r a i n to fi was previously binding. Due to this diﬀerence between private and social
marginal utility, we can have constrained eﬃcient arrangements where i is transferring a positive
amount to i0 even though i0 has lower weighted marginal utility, because this transfer, by keeping
the consumption of i0 high, softens the IC constraint of i0 on transfers to another agent i00, who has
high marginal utility. To get around this issue, in the Appendix we deﬁne the marginal social gain
of an additional unit of transfer to i, denoted ∆i, for each agent i using an iterative procedure,
which takes into account the indirect eﬀect of softening IC constraints and transferring further
some of the additional resources.
Using ∆i instead of the private marginal utilities allows us to extend all the results in this
23section. We obtain ﬁrst order conditions that are analogous to Proposition 5: in a constrained
eﬃcient arrangement, either ∆i = ∆j of the link between i and j has to be blocked. Using
this result, we can also partition the network into endogenous risk-sharing islands, such that ∆i
is equalized within islands while links are blocked across islands. The results of Corollary 2 on
monotonicity, local sharing, and more sharing with close friends also have analogous extensions to
this environment, which are formally presented in the Appendix.
Finally, for an agent i who is not on the boundary of his risk-sharing island and hence has
no binding IC constraints, the marginal social gain does equal λi times his marginal utility of
consumption; hence, for such agents, the results presented in this section hold without modiﬁcation.
For example, weighted marginal utilities are equalized for two agents inside the same risk-sharing
island and away from the island boundary. This argument establishes that if risk-sharing islands
are “large”, then the results from the perfect substitute case hold without modiﬁcation for most
agents.
4 Indirect eﬀects of an aid program
We plan to simulate our model using network data from Peru, to evaluate the indirect eﬀects of a
hypothetical development aid program. Because of network spillovers, in our model aid will also
beneﬁt the non-treated, as shown in Corollary 1 in the previous section. This is consistent with the
empirical ﬁndings of Angelucci and De Giorgi (2007). We plan to identify individuals who should
be targeted to maximize both the direct and indirect eﬀect of aid.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed a theory of informal risk-sharing in social networks. We have shown that
expansive networks facilitate informal insurance, and argued that many real-life social networks are
likely to be suﬃciently expansive to allow for good risk-sharing. We also characterized second-best
arrangements and found that they exhibit local risk-sharing. In current work, we are exploring the
implications of our model for the indirect eﬀect of development aid. In future work, we would like
to develop other empirical applications.
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27Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
We prove the more general version of the theorem allowing for directed links, so that c(i,j)
and c(j,i) may diﬀer. Necessity is immediate. To prove suﬃciency, let gi = ei − xi the amount
that i has to transfer away, and let gF =
P
i∈F ei for any subset of agents F.N o t et h a tgW =0by
eW = xW.L e tS be the set of agents for whom gi ≥ 0 and let T = W\S.D e ﬁne the auxiliary graph
G0 which has two additional vertices, s and t, and additional edges connecting s with all agents
in S, and additional edges connecting t with all agents in t.F o r a n y i ∈ S,d e ﬁne the capacity
c(s,i)=gi and c(i,s)=0 . Similarly, for any j ∈ T,l e tc(j,t)=−gj and c(t,j)=0 .
The auxiliary graph is useful, because implementing the desired consumption allocation is equiv-
alent to ﬁnding an s → t ﬂow in G0 that has value gS =
P
ei≥0 gi. To see why, note that in the
desired allocation, exactly gi must leave each agent i ∈ S. The capacities on the new links ensure
that in any s → t ﬂow, at most gi can leave agent i. Similarly, to implement the target, exactly −gj
must ﬂow to each agent j ∈ T, and the capacity on the (j,t) link ensures that this is the maximum
that can ﬂow to j.A sar e s u l t ,a n yﬂow with value
P
ei≥0 gi must, by construction, take exactly gi
away from i and deliver exactly gj to j.
We have reduced our implementation problem to a ﬂow problem. To compute the maximum
s → t ﬂow, we instead compute the value of the minimum cut. Fix a minimum cut. In this cut,
some links of s and t are cut. Let S1 ⊆ S denote those agents whose link with s is cut in the
minimum cut, and let T1 ⊆ T denote those agents in T whose link with t is cut. Clearly, the total
value of the links cut that connected S1 with s and T1 with t is gS1 − gT1.L e t S2 = S\S1 and
T2 = T\T1. We claim that if we consider the restriction of the cut to the original graph G,t h e n
there will be no S2 → T2 paths that survive. Suppose not; then there is some s2 → t2 path in G
after the cut. But this is also an s2 → t2 path in the auxiliary graph G0, and since s2 is connected
to s and t2 to t after the cut, it generates an s → t path after the cut, which is a contradiction.
Let H be the set of agents h who can be accessed by s → h paths in G after the cut. By the
above argument, S2 ⊆ H and T2 ⊆ T\H. By construction of H, the value of the cut in G must be
cout [H]=cin [W\H], and therefore the value of the cut in G0 is gS1 − gT1 + cout [H]. Suppose that
|H| ≤ N/2. Then we know from (3) that cout [H] ≥ gH. Thus the value of the cut in G0 can be
bounded from below as
gS1 − gT1 + gH = gS1 − gT1 +( gS2 + gH∩T1 + gH∩S1) ≥ gS1 + gS2 = gS
28w h e r ew eu s e dt h a tH can be decomposed as a disjoint union of S2, H ∩ T1 and H ∩ S1 and that
−gT1 ≥− gT1∩H because gj is negative for all j ∈ T1. It follows that the value of the maximum ﬂow
is at least gS, as desired. Note that the maximum ﬂow cannot exceed gS, because deleting all links
between s and S is a valid cut with value gS. Thus the value of the maximum ﬂow is exactly gS.
When |H| >N / 2, an analogous argument can be used with W\H instead of H.
The following Lemma will be useful.
Lemma 1 Let Z be a random variable such that |Z| ≤ c almost surely. Then σZ ≤ c,a n dt h i s
bound is sharp.
Proof. Let G(z0) be the family of probability distributions of random variables that satisfy
|Z| ≤ c and EZ = z0.T h i sf a m i l yo fm e a s u r e si st i g h t ,a n db yP r o k h o r o v ’ st h e o r e m ,i ti sr e l a t i v e l y
compact in the weak topology. The variance of a random variable with distribution G ∈ G(z0) is
R
(z − z0)
2 G(dz). Here the integrand is a bounded continuous function because G is concentrated
on the [−c,c] interval, implying that variance is a continuous function with respect to the weak
topology on G(z0), and then compactness implies that there exists G∗ ∈ G(z0) that has the highest
variance.
Let Z∗ be a random variable with distribution G∗. Suppose that |Z∗| <cwith positive probabil-
ity; then there is some ε>0 such that Pr(|Z∗| <c− ε) >ε .L e tY be a random variable indepen-
dent of Z∗ that assigns equal probabilities to +1 and −1, and consider Z0 = Z∗+χ{|Z∗| <c− ε}·εY
where χ{|Z∗| <c− ε} is an indicator function. It is easy to see that EZ0 =EZ = z0,a n dt h a t
|Z0| ≤ c;t h u sG0, the probability distribution of Z0,i si nG(z0). The variance of Z0 can be written
as
Pr(|Z∗| ≥ c − ε)·E
h
(Z∗ − z0)




(Z∗ − z0 + εY )
2 ||Z∗| <c− ε
i
.










≥ Pr(|Z∗| <c− ε)·E
h
(Z∗ − z0)
2 ||Z∗| <c− ε
i
+ε3
w h e r ew eu s e dt h a tY has mean zero, unit variance, and is independent of Z∗. Combining this bound
with the previous expression yields var[Z0] ≥E(Z∗ − z0)
2 + ε3 which contradicts the optimality of
Z∗. It follows that the optimal Z∗ must satisfy |Z∗| = c with probability one. Given that EZ∗ = z0
29must also hold this implies that Z∗ = c with probability 1/2+z0/2c and Z∗ = −c with remaining
probability. The variance of Z∗ is then (c − z0)
2, which is maximal when z0 =0 , and the highest
possible variance of Z that satisﬁes |Z| ≤ c is c2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) We prove the more general result that when the MRS is bounded from above by K,n o
Pareto-optimal allocation can be implemented when a[F] <σ /K for some F.L e t (ei)i∈W and
(e0
i)i∈W be two endowment realizations, and i and j two agents. Wilson (1968) shows that any











where xi and x0
i are the goods consumption of agent i in the two endowment realizations. This
ﬁrst order condition simply states that in any Pareto-optimal arrangement, the marginal rates of
substitution across diﬀerent states are equalized for all agents. This equation implies that in a
Pareto-optimal arrangement, agents have the same cardinal ranking for all states of the world: if
agent i prefers (ei)i∈W to (e0
i)i∈W, then so does agent j.
Let a =m i n |F|≤N/2 a[F]. By assumption, σi ≥ Ka for all agents i. By Lemma 1, this implies
that for every i there exists mi such that ei assumes both values below mi and values above Mi =
mi +Ka with positive probability. Now suppose that, contrary to the assertion in the Proposition,
a Pareto-optimal incentive compatible arrangement exists. Let F be a set with a[F] <σ /K.B y
Assumption 1, the set of realizations (ei)i∈W where for all i ∈ F, ei >M i,a n df o ra l lj/ ∈ F,
ej <m j form a positive probability event. Note that for any such realization, the total goods
consumption of agents in F is at least
P
i∈F Mi − Kc[F], where the second term is the maximum
amount that can leave the set F. Similarly, the total goods consumption of agents outside F is at
most
P
i/ ∈F mi + Kc[F].
Now consider a second set of realizations (e0
i), where for all i ∈ F we have e0
i <m i,a n df o ra l l
j/ ∈ F we have e0
j >M j. By assumption, this set of realizations also has positive probability. For
each such realization, the total consumption of agents in F is at most
P
i∈F mi + Kc[F],a n dt h e
total consumption of agents in W\F is at least
P
i/ ∈F Mi − Kc[F].
These results imply that the total consumption of F is higher in (ei) than in (e0
i),s i n c et h e








holds because Mi − mi = Ka = Kc[F]/|F| by deﬁnition. In contrast, the total consumption of
agents in W\F is higher in (e0
i) than in (ei), because the upper bound in (ei) is does not exceed










i/ ∈F Mi − mi =( N − [F])Ka = Kc[F] · (N − [F])/|F| ≥ Kc[F]. Taken together, these
ﬁndings violate the property of Pareto optimality that agents have a common ranking over states
of the world: there must be some agent in F who prefers (ei) to (e0
i), and at the same time there
must be some agent in W\F who prefers (e0
i) to (ei). This is a contradiction.
To show that there is an agent in F who is not fully insured, note that there is some i ∈ F who
prefers a positive probability of realizations (ei)i∈W to a positive probability of realizations (e0
i)i∈W;
and within these events, there is j/ ∈ F who prefers a positive probability of (e0
i) to (ei).B u tt h i s
means that we could improve the expected utility of i and j by transferring a small amount from i
to j in (ei) and transferring a small amount back from j to i in (e0
i).
(ii) Theorem 1 provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementing the proﬁle when
all agents consume zero. For any set F, the excess demand is at most |F|·σ,w h i c hm u s tb el e s s
than or equal to c[F].T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oσ ≤ a[F] for all F with |F| ≤ N/2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Consider an N long segment on the line, and split it into intervals of length k.F o r e a c h
segment F, σF = σ
√









To obtain the sharpest bound, let k =1 6( c/σ)
2,w h i c hg i v e s






31(ii) We establish a considerably more general result. We begin by listing our assumptions:
(D1) [Thin tails] The yj variables are independent, have zero mean and unit variance, and
satisfy logEexp[θyj] ≤ Kθ2/2 for some K with all θ ≥ 0.






Here (D1) is a uniform bound on the moment-generating function of yj, and allows us to use
the theory of large deviations to bound the tails of weighted sums of yj. This condition is satisﬁed
if the yj random variables are i.i.d. normal, or if they have a common compact support, and in
many other cases.
(E1) [No aggregate risk] Endowments satisfy σF/|F| ≤ K1 ·| F|
−K2 for some K1,K 2 > 0.
( E 2 )[ M o r ep e o p l eh a v em o r er i s k ]F o ra l lG ⊆ F,w eh a v eσG ≤ σF.
(E3) [Sharing with more people is always good.] For all G ⊆ F,w eh a v eσF/|F| ≤ σG/|G|.
(N1) The network is connected, countably inﬁnite, and there exists a constant K3 such that all
agents have at most K3 direct friends.
We also impose a set of conditions on the network that allows for a decomposition similar to
the square structure on the plane. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w er e q u i r et h a tf o ra l lm ≥ 1 integers there exist a
collection of sets Fi
j,w h e r ei =1 ,...,m and j =1 ,...,∞ that satisfy the following properties.
(S1) [Partition] For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the sets Fi
j, j =1 ,...,∞ give a partition of the set of agents;
and when i =1 , all sets F1
j are singletons.
(S2) [Ascending chain] For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and all j,j0,w eh a v ee i t h e rFi
j ∩ Fi+1















Let G ⊆ F be two sets, and deﬁne the relative perimeter of G in F, denoted c0 [G]F,a st h e
perimeter of G in the subgraph generated by the set of vertices F.
(S4) [Relative perimeter] There exists K>0 such that for any G ⊆ Fi
j with |G| ≤
¯ ¯ ¯Fi
j
¯ ¯ ¯/2 we
have c0 [G]Fi
j ≥ K · c0 [G].
Here (S1) means that for each i,t h ei-level sets partition the entire network. (S2) requires that
each i +1 -level set is a disjoint union of some i-level sets, so i-level sets partition the i +1 -level
sets.(S3) requires that the size of these sets grows exponentially, and (S4) means that the Fi
j sets
are good “snapshots” of the network: the perimeter of sets inside Fi
j is proportional to their total
perimeter.. For the plane a decomposition with squares generates a partition that satisﬁes these
properties; since there are 4 identical squares in each larger square, we can set γ = γ =4 .
32The following is the key substantive condition.





¯ ¯ ¯/2,w eh a v eσG ≤ c · c0 [G]Fi
j.
This is just a version of the usual perimeter/area ratio condition. Together with (S4), it implies
that there exists c0 > 0 such that for all i,j,a n df o ra l lG ⊆ Fi





¯ ¯/2,w eh a v e
σG ≤ c0 · c0 [G]Fi
j. To simplify notation, we redeﬁne c0 to be c0 · c0. T h e nw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
result.





Proposition 2 (i) is an immediate consequence of this result. The proof is the following.
Intuition. Fix m, and consider the decomposition described above. Our strategy is to construct
an unconstrained ﬂow that implements equal sharing within each set Fm
j , j =1 ,...,∞ (these are the
“biggest squares” in the plane). We then compute the implied capacity use of this ﬂow for each link.
Then we choose m and c simultaneously in such a way that the unconstrained ﬂow actually satisﬁes
all capacity constraints “most of the time.” This ﬂow will then implement essentially equal sharing
for the Fm sets, and hence by (E1) implements exponentially small SDISP. But we also have to
bound the impact of the exceptional events when the ﬂow does hit some capacity constraints. This
results in an additional term that is sub-exponential in c; and combining these two terms leads to
the bound of the proposition.
Induction logic. The unconstrained ﬂow is constructed iteratively, by ﬁrst smoothing consump-
tion within each F1
j set; then smoothing consumption within each F2
j set; and so on. When i =1 ,
all sets are singletons, so there is no need to smooth within a set. Now consider the step when we











o¯ ¯ ¯ denote the number of i level sets in Fi+1
j .





≤ K6.T os i m p l i f y
notation, denote Fi+1
j by F, and denote the i-level sets Fi
j0 that are subsets of F by F1,...,Fk where
k ≤ K6. We know from (S1) and (S2) that F1,...,Fk partition F. We will now smooth consumption
in Fi+1
j by ﬁrst smoothing the total amount of resources currently present in F1 through the entire
set F; then smoothing the total amount currently in F2 through the set F, and so on until Fk.
Induction step. To smooth the total consumption of F1 in F, ﬁrst note that this quantity is
the same as the total endowment in F1, because in each round i, we are smoothing all endowments
within an i-level set. Second, having completely smoothed resources in F1 in the previous round,
33currently all agents in F1 are allocated eF1/|F1| units of consumption (for a total of |F1|·eF1/|F1| =
eF1.)
Flow construction. To smooth this over F,w en o wd e ﬁne a ﬂo w . T h i si sak e ys t e pi nt h e
proof. For this ﬂow, focus on the subgraph generated by F together with the original capacities
c0, and assume for the moment that each agent in F1 has σF1/|F1| units of the consumption good
(so the total in F1 is exactly σF1), while each agent in F\F1 has zero. We will show that a ﬂow
respecting capacities c0 can achieve equal sharing in F from this endowment proﬁle; and then use
this ﬂow to construct an unconstrained ﬂow implementing the desired sharing over F for arbitrary
shock realizations.
To verify that equal sharing can be implemented in the above endowment proﬁle, we use Theo-
rem 1; this is where the key perimeter/area condition (K) plays it’s role. According to the theorem,
we can implement equal sharing if for each set G ⊆ F with |G| ≤ |F|/2, the excess demand for
goods does not exceed the perimeter (relative to F). What is this excess demand? Since we want
equal sharing, we should allocate σF1/|F| to every agent in G. But those guys in G who are also








If there is a feasible ﬂow, then for every G, the absolute value of this excess demand ed(G) should
be less than c0 [G]F. To check that this holds, ﬁrst assume that |G|/|F| ≥ |G ∩ F1|/|F1|;t h e n
the above formula implies |ed(G)| ≤ σF1 ·| G|/|F|. But from (E2) we have σF1 ≤ σF,i m p l y i n g
|ed(G)| ≤ σF ·| G|/|F|; and from (E3), σF/|F| ≤ σG/|G|, which then implies that |ed(G)| ≤ σG.
Now recall our key condition (K) that σG ≤ c0 [G]F; it follows that |ed(G)| ≤ c0 [G]F as desired. We
now check that this inequality also holds when |G|/|F| < |G ∩ F1|/|F1|. In this case, the formula
for ed(G) displayed above implies |ed(G)| ≤ σF1 ·|G ∩ F1|/|F1|.S i n c eσF1/|F1| ≤ σG∩F1/|G ∩ F1|
by (E3), we can bound the right hand side from above by σG∩F1,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes σG∩F1 ≤ σG ≤
c0 [G]F and we are done.
So the proposed ﬂow can indeed be implemented. Let the associated transfers be denoted by
t1.T o g e t a ﬂow smoothing the consumption of F1 over F for arbitrary shocks, we just use the
transfers t1 · eF1/σF1; that is, we scale up the above ﬂow with the actual size of the shock in F1.
Extending this logic, to smooth the endowment of each Fj through the set F,w ej u s tc o n s t r u c t
t2,. . . ,tk analogously, and implement the transfers t1 · eF1/σF1 + ... + tk · eFk/σFk.I ti si m p o r t a n t
34to note that this construction results in an unconstrained ﬂow. While we used the capacities to
construct the ﬂo w( t h i si sh o ww eg o tt1,..., tk), the actual ﬂow is a stochastic object that may
violate some capacity constraints, both because it is scaled by eF1/σF1 and because it is summed
over all j.
Repeat. We do the above step for all i +1 -level sets Fi+1
j ; this concludes round i +1of the
algorithm. Then we go on to round i +2 ,a n ds oo n ,u n t i lﬁnally we implement equal sharing in
each of the highest-level sets Fm
j , j =1 ,...,∞. How low is SDISP at the end of this procedure?
To answer, recall that (S3) implies
¯ ¯ ¯Fm
j
¯ ¯ ¯ ≥ γm, and (E1) implies σF/|F| ≤ K1 ·| F|
−K2,s o
that SDISP ≤ K1 · γ−K2m = K1 · exp[−K7m] for some K7 > 0. This SDISP, however, is
implemented with an unconstrained ﬂow; and now we want to assess how often the ﬂow violates
capacity constraints once we choose c and m. To do this, we need to compute the distribution of
the ﬂow over each link in the network.
Link usage. Consider the step where we smooth the consumption of F1 o v e rt h ee n t i r es e tF
using the ﬂow t1 · eF1/σF1.F i x s o m e (u,v) link; then the use of this link in the ﬂow is t1 (u,v) ·
eF1/σF1. This is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation t1 (u,v),s i n c eeF1/σF1
has unit standard deviation. Moreover, we know that t1 (u,v) ≤ c0 (u,v) because this is how t1
was constructed (this is why it was important to construct t1 such that it satisﬁes the capacity
constraints c0.) It follows that the standard deviation of the link use in this ﬂow is at most c0 (u,v).
Now consider link use as we smooth the consumption of all sets F1,. . . ,Fk over the set F.B y
the argument of the previous paragraph, as we smooth each of these sets, we add a ﬂow over the
(u,v) link that is normally distributed, and has a standard deviation of at most c0 (u,v).S ot h e
total standard deviation of the ﬂow over (u,v) generated in one round of the algorithm is at the
most K6·c0 (u,v). Finally, we have to add up these ﬂow demands over all m rounds; thus the total
standard deviation of the ﬂow demand over a link is at most mK6 · c0 (u,v).
Bounding exceptional event. To bound the contribution of the exceptional events to SDISP, we
ﬁrst need to specify what is the constrained ﬂow. We do the following: Fix some c and m,a n d
for each agent u, try to implement his inﬂows and outﬂows according to the unconstrained ﬂow
corresponding to m we just constructed. If this is not possible because some of his constraints
are hit, we implement as much of the prescribed ﬂows as possible. This procedure assumes that
binding constraints do not propagate down the network.
Consider some agent u ∈ Fm
j = F, and suppose that the constraint binds the unconstrained
ﬂow over an (u,v) link, but on no other link of u. The contribution of this event to the variance of




[eF + t(v,u) − c(v,u)]
2 dP





F +[t(v,u) − c(v,u)]








Here the ﬁrst term is six times the unconstrained DISP, and the second term is six times the integral
of the square of the random variable (t(u,v)) on a tail event. We now bound this latter term using
(D1), using the theory of large deviations.
Large deviations. Let z =
P
j αjyj for some αj satisfying
P
α2
j < ∞. Then, for any c>0 and
θ>0,









Now we can bound the last term using (D1) to obtain






















, resulting in the bound











j. This shows that the tail probabilities of
z can be bounded by a term exponentially small in (c/σz)
2,j u s tl i k ei nt h ec a s ew h e nz is normally
distributed.
Bound on remaining variance. Using the bound on the tail probability, we can estimate the
ﬁnal term in (6). Let z = t(u,v) which is a weighted sum of the yj shocks by construction; denoting






















2(z − c(u,v))[1 − H (z)]dz

















Since the standard deviation of z = t(u,v) is at most mK6c0 (u,v) and c(u,v)=c · c0 (u,v),





. We need to similarly bound the contribution
of the exceptional event for every other link of u where the constraint may be violated, and for
every pair of links, and so on. Since u has a bounded number of links, this will just increase the
above bound by a constant factor. So overall, the exceptional event contributes a constant times





to the SDISP of the constrained allocation. So
in total, we have








Now let m = c2/3, then we obtain





P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
We will pick a large enough grid that does not intersect with any of the agents. Inside each of
the squares in the grid, we can get good risk-sharing because there are only a bounded number of
people. To share across squares, we make use of the result that we have good risk-sharing on the
plane, and the fact that the squares in the grid approximate a plane.
Pick a grid size g>K 1, and place a grid with this stepsize on the plane that does not overlap
with any agent (this is possible, because there are only a countable number of agents). By (P1),
under capacities c0 there is a capacity of at least 1 between any pair of adjacent squares on the
grid. If some pairs of adjacent squares have capacity exceeding 1, then delete some links or reduce
capacities such that in the resulting network the capacity between any pair of adjacent squares is
exactly 1. Index the squares in the grid by j =1 ,...,∞ and denote the set of agents in square j by
Gj.
We know from (P2) that the subgraph spanned by Gj is connected, and that K1 ≤ |Gj| ≤ K3
1.
The upper bound here implies that we have σGj ≤ K7 for K7 = K3
1σ by assumptions (E4) and
37(E5). We now do the following. Pick c, and use capacity c/10 to implement between-squares
risk-sharing using the previous Proposition, taking eGj as the “endowment shocks” of the squares.
To see that the previous result is indeed applicable, we only need to check the key condition (K).
But that holds, because for any union of grid-squares G,w eh a v eσG ≤ K8 |G|
1/2 (here |G| refers
to the number of grid-squares in G) by condition (E5). This allocation generates between-squares
dispersion which is exponentially small in c2/3.
N o ww ej u s th a v et os m o o t ht h ei n c o m i n ga n do utgoing transfers as well as the endowments
within each square. Use capacity 4c/10 within the squares to smooth all incoming and outgoing
transfers across all agents in the square. Since the total perimeter of the square is 4c/10,a n dGj is
connected, this can be done with probability one. Now it remains to smooth the total endowment
shock realized in the square, and we still have capacity c/2 to do this. Since the square is a ﬁnite
network, the number of agents and the variances of all shocks are bounded, and all pairs of agents
are connected by a path of at least a constant capacity, we know that we can achieve within-square





with shocks satisfying (D1) and (D2). This is smaller
than the main exp
£
−c2/3¤
term; hence the proof is complete.











where tF denotes the total transfer leaving F.U s i n gL e m m a1 ,|cov[tF,e F]| ≤ c[F]·σ(eF),w h i c h
implies the claim of the proposition.
Proofs for Section 2.6
The following result is discussed in the text in Section 2.6:
Proposition 8 Assume that MRSi is increasing in xi for all i„ then for any pair of endowment
realizations e and e such that ei ≤ ei for all i,t h es e to fI Ct r a n s f e ra r r a n g e m e n t si ne is a subset
of the set of IC transfer arrangements in e.
Proof. Let V (yi,c i;si)=Ui (yi + si,c i),t h e n(Vx/Vc)(yi,c i;si)=( Ux/Uc)(yi + si,c i),a n d
hence the condition that MRSi =( Ux/Uc)(xi,c i) is increasing in xi implies that (Vx/Vc)(yi,c i;s)
is increasing in s for any ﬁxed (yi,c i), i.e., that V (yi,c i;s) satisﬁes the Spence-Mirrlees single-
crossing condition. Since Ui is continuously diﬀerentiable and Ux, Uc > 0, Theorem 3 in Milgrom
38and Shannon (1994) implies that V has the single crossing property. In particular, V (yi,c i;0)≥
V (y0
i,c 0
i;0)implies V (yi,c i;si) ≥ V (y0
i,c 0
i;si) for any si ≥ 0, or equivalently, Ui (xi,c i) ≥ Ui (x0
i,c 0
i)
implies Ui (xi + si,c i) ≥ Ui (x0
i + si,c 0
i).
Now let t be an IC transfer arrangement under e and let x be the associated consumption proﬁle.
Incentive compatibility implies Ui (xi,c i) ≥ Ui (xi + tij,c− c(i,j)).D e n o t i n ge−e = s ≥ 0,b yt h e
single crossing property we have Ui (xi + si,c i) ≥ Ui (xi + si + tij,c− c(i,j)). But the consumption
proﬁle resulting from the transfer arrangement t under realization e is exactly x = x+s, and hence
the last inequality shows that t is IC under e as well.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We prove the following more general result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the MRSi is concave in xi for every i. Then every constrained
eﬃcient arrangement is the solution to a planner’s problem with some set of weights (λi),a n d
conversely, any solution to the planner’s problem is constrained eﬃcient.
Proof. Let U∗ ⊆ RW be the set of expected utility proﬁles that can be achieved by IC transfer
arrangements: U∗ = {(vi)i∈W|∃ IC allocation x such that vi ≤EUi (xi,c i) ∀i}. Our goal is to show
that U is convex. By concave utility, it suﬃces to prove that the set of IC arrangements is convex.
To show that the convex combination of IC arrangements is IC, ﬁxa ne n d o w m e n tr e a l i z a t i o n
e and let x be an IC allocation. Consider an agent i,a n df o rr ≥ 0 deﬁne y(r,xi) to be the
consumption level that makes i indiﬀerent between his current allocation and reducing friendship
consumption by r units, that is, U (xi,c i)=U (y(r,xi),c i − r).F o r d i ﬀerent values of r,t h e
locations (y(r,xi),c− r) trace out an indiﬀerence curve of i.N o t et h a ty(0,x i)=xi and that the
IC constraint for the transfer between i and j c a nb ew r i t t e na s
tij ≤ y(c(i,j),x i) − xi (7)
since y(c(i,j),x i)−xi is the dollar gain that makes i accept losing the friendship with j.M o r e o v e r ,




(y,ci − r) (8)
which is the marginal rate of substitution MRSi. T h i si si n t u i t i v e : MRSi measures the dollar
value of a marginal change in friendship consumption. Using that concavity of the MRS, we will
39show that y(r,xi) is a concave function in xi for any r ≥ 0.W h e nr = c(i,j), this implies that the
convex combination of IC allocations also satisﬁes the IC constraint (7), and consequently, that the
set of IC proﬁles is convex.














,s ot h a t(y(r),c i − r)











and let f (r)=U (y(r),c i − r), the utility of agent i along this curve. Clearly, f (0) = U (x3,c i).
Moreover, using (8),






















,c i − r
¢¸
− Uc (y(r),c i − r)
≤ Ux (y(r),c i − r) ·
Uc
Ux
(y(r),c i − r) − Uc (y(r),c i − r)=0
where we used the assumption that Uc/Ux is concave in the ﬁrst argument. It follows that f is





















, and hence that y(x,r) is concave.
Finally, let P(U∗) denote the Pareto-frontier of U∗.S i n c e U∗ is convex, the supporting hy-
perplane theorem implies that for every u0 ∈ P(U∗) there exist positive weights λi such that
u0 ∈ argmaxU∗
P
i λiui, as desired. The converse statement in the proposition holds for any U∗.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Fix realization e,a n dl e tt denote the vector of transfers over all links in a given IC arrangement.









Then the planner’s maximization problem can be written as maxt V (t) subject to tij ≤ c(i,j) and
tij = −tji for all i and j. It is easy to see that Karush-Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst order conditions associated
with this problem are those given in the Proposition. Since we have a concave maximization problem
where the inequality constraints are linear, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are both necessary
and suﬃcient for characterizing a global maximum. For uniqueness, rewrite the planner’s objective
as a function of the consumption proﬁle x, V (x)=V (t). This function is strictly convex in x
and maximized over a convex domain, and hence the maximizing consumption allocation is unique,
although the transfer proﬁle supporting it need not be.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
For each i and j,s a yt h a ti and j are in the same equivalence class if there is an i → j path
40such that for all agents l on this path, including j,w eh a v eλiU0
i = λlU0
l. The partition generated
by these equivalence classes is the set of risk-sharing islands Wk.I fi ∈ Wk and j/ ∈ Wk, then either
c(i,j)=0 ,i nw h i c hc a s etij = c(i,j) by deﬁnition, or c(i,j) > 0, which implies that λiU0
i 6= λlU0
l
by construction of the equivalence classes. But then Proposition 5 implies that |tij| = c(i,j),a s
desired.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2
In this proof we focus on transfer arrangements that are acyclical, i.e., have the property that
after any endowment realization there is no path of linked agents i1 → ik such that i1 = ik,a n d
til il+1 > 0 ∀ l ∈ {1,...,k− 1}. This is without loss of generality, as it is easy to show that for any
IC arrangement there is an outcome equivalent acyclical IC arrangement that achieves the same
consumption vector after any endowment realization.
(i): We establish a stronger monotonicity property. Say that a transfer arrangement is strongly
monotone if for any F ⊆ W and any two endowment realizations (e) and (e0) such that e0
i ≤ ei for
all i ∈ F and t0
ji ≤ tji for all i ∈ F and j/ ∈ F,w eh a v ex0
i ≤ xi for all i ∈ F. Strong monotonicity
means that for any set of agents F, reducing their endowments and/or their incoming transfers
weakly reduces everybody’s consumption.
Fix a constrained eﬃcient arrangement, and suppose that is not strongly monotone. Let F be
a set where this property fails, and ﬁx a connected component of the subgraph spanned F that
contains an agent i such that x0
i >x i.L e tS be the set of agents for whom x0
i ≤ xi,a n dT be the
set of agents for whom x0
i >x i in this component. S is non-empty, because the total endowment
available in any connected component of F has decreased, and T is non-empty by assumption. In
addition, there exist s ∈ S and t ∈ T such that t0
st >t st, because consumption in T is higher under
e0 than under e.B u tt0
st >t st implies c(s,t) >t st and c(t,s) >t 0
ts, and hence, by Proposition 5,
λsU0
s(xs) ≥ λtU0




t) in e0.S i n c ex0
t >x t by assumption, strict
concavity implies λtUt(x0
t) <λ tU0




s(xs). But this implies xs <x 0
s, which is a contradiction. Finally, the claim that
x0
j <x j for all j ∈ c W(i) follows directly from this monotonicity condition combined with (ii) which
is proved below.
(ii): Let b Li denote the set of links connecting agents in c W(i).L e t Li denote the set of links
connecting agents in W(i).L e t t be an IC transfer arrangement achieving x(e) at endowment
realization e, such that tkl <c (k,l) ∀ (k,l) ∈ Li.L e t b =m i n
(k,l)∈e Li
(c(k,l) − |tkl|).L e t L0
i denote
41the set of links connecting agents in W(i) with agents in N/W(i). For every (k,l) ∈ L0
i, let t0
kl




kl).B y P r o p o s i t i o n 5 , t0
kl 6=0∀ (k,l) ∈ L0
i.L e t




kl|.L e tb0 =m i n ( b,b0). Recall that λjU0
j(xj(e)) = λiU0
i(xi(e)) ∀ j ∈ W(i).T h e nf o r
any |ei − e0
i| <b 0 there is transfer arrangement t00 such that (i) t+t00 is IC; (ii) t00
ij <b 0 ∀ (i,j) ∈ L;
(iii) t00
ij =0whenever i/ ∈ W(i) or j/ ∈ W(i);( i v )t h eﬁrst-order conditions of Proposition 5 hold for
any (i,j) ∈ Li. Then (ii), (iii), and b0 ≤ b0 imply that the ﬁrst-order conditions of Proposition 5
hold for any (i,j) ∈ L0. Moreover, (iii) implies that the ﬁrst-order conditions of Proposition 5 hold
for any (i,j) ∈ L such that i,j / ∈ W(i).T h e r e f o r et h eﬁrst-order conditions of Proposition 5 hold
for every link at consumption vector e0 + t+ t00 after endowment realization e0.P r o p o s i t i o n5t h e n
implies that e0+t+t00 is the constrained eﬃcient consumption vector after e0.N o t et h a tb0 ≤ b and
(ii) above imply tij + t00
ij <c (i,j) ∀ (i,j) ∈ b Li, hence by Proposition 5 λjU0
j(xj(e0)) = λiU0
i(xi(e0))
∀ j ∈ c W(i). Finally, (iii) above implies xj(e0)=xj(e) ∀ j/ ∈ W(i).
(iii): Let t0 be an acyclical transfer arrangement achieving x(e0) after endowment realization
e0. Then we can decompose t0 as the sum of acyclical transfer arrangements t and t00 such that t
achieves x(e) after endowment realization e.B yp a r t( i )a b o v e ,xj0(e0) ≤ xj0(e) ∀ j0 ∈ W. Therefore
if xj(e0)=xj(e) then the statement in the claim holds. Assume now that xj(e0) <x j(e).S i n c e




l0l ≤ 0. This, together
with xj(e0) <x j(e) implies that there is a j → i path such that t00
imim+1 > 0 along the path.
Hence, in transfer scheme t no link (im,i m+1) along the above j → i path is blocked, implying
λim+1U0
im+1(xim+1 (e)) ≤ λimU0
im(xim (e)), and that no link (im+1,i m) along the reverse i → j path
is blocked, implying λim+1U0
im+1(xim+1 (e0)) ≥ λimU0
im(xim (e0)). Dividing these inequalities yields
the result.
Formal results for Section 3.3
A decentralized exchange implementing any constrained eﬃcient arrangement
We show that for any constrained eﬃcient allocation, there exists a simple iterative procedure
that only uses local information in each round of the iteration, and converges to the allocation
as the number of iterations grow. A simpler version of this procedure, with equal welfare weights
and no capacity constraints, was proposed by Bramoulle and Kranton (2006). The basic idea is to
equalize, subject to the capacity constraints, the marginal utility of every pair of connected agents
at each round of iteration. This procedure can be interpreted as a set of rules of thumb for behavior
that implements constrained eﬃciency in a decentralized way.
42Fix an endowment realization e, and denote the eﬃcient allocation corresponding to welfare
weights λi by x∗. Fix an order of all links in the network: l1,...,lL,a n dl e tik and jk denote the agents
connected by lk. To initialize the procedure, set xi = ei and tij =0for all i and j. Then, in every
round m =1 ,2,..., go through the links l1,...,l L in this order, and for every lk,g i v e nt h ec u r r e n t




jk−xjk such that they
satisfy the following two properties: (1) x0
ik +x0













This amounts to the agent with lower marginal utility helping out his friend up to the the point
where either their marginal utility is equalized, or the capacity constraint starts to bind. Once this
step is completed for link k,w es e tx = x0 and t = t0 before moving on to link k+1.F o rm =1 ,2,...
let xm
i denote the value of xi,a n dl e ttm
ij denote the value of tij, at the end of round m.N o t et h a t
xm is IC by design for every m.
Proposition 10 If consumption and friendship are perfect substitutes, then xm → x∗ as m →∞ .
Proof: Let V (x) denote the value of the planner’s objective in allocation x.T h ea b o v ep r o c e -
dure weakly increases V (x) in every round and for every link lk.H e n c eV (x1) ≤ V (x2) ≤ ..,a n d
since V (x) ≤ V (x∗) for all x that are IC, we have limm→∞ V (xm)=V ≤ V (x∗). Since the set
of IC allocations is compact, and xm is IC for every m, there exists a convergent subsequence of
xm, with limit x and associated transfers t.C l e a r l y ,V (x)=V .I fV = V ∗ then x = x∗ since the
optimum is unique. If V< V ∗,t h e nx is not optimal, and hence does not satisfy the ﬁrst order
condition over all links. Let lk be the ﬁr s tl i n ki nt h ea b o v eo r d e rf o rw h i c ht h eﬁrst order condition
fails in x and t. Then there is an IC transfer at x that increases the planner’s objective by a strictly
positive amount δ. But this means that for every xm far along the convergent subsequence, the
planner’s objective increases by at least δ/2 at that round, which implies that V (xm) is divergent,
a contradiction. Hence limxm = x∗ along all convergent subsequences, which implies that xm itself
converges to x∗.
Constrained eﬃcient arrangements are robust to coalitional deviations
G i v e na nI Ca r r a n g e m e n tt, an ex ante coalitional deviation by a set of agents F is a transfer
arrangement t0 among agents in F that takes on values conditional on the endowment realizations
of all agents in W. An ex ante coalitional deviation is proﬁtable if t0 is IC, and given transfer
arrangement that speciﬁes transfers t0 for agents in F and transfers according to t otherwise,
all agents in F are weakly better oﬀ and one of them is strictly better oﬀ than given transfer
43arrangement t. Note that we do not require the transfer arrangement that speciﬁes transfers t0 for
agents in F and transfers according to t otherwise to be IC. That is, a coalitional deviation might
involve withholding transfers speciﬁed by t to agents outside F, for some state realizations..12
Proposition 11 If goods and friendship are perfect substitutes, then an IC allocation is con-
strained eﬃcient if and only if it admits no proﬁtable ex ante coalitional deviations.
Proof: F i xa nI Ca r r a n g e m e n tx, and consider an ex ante proﬁtable coalitional deviation t0
by agents in a coalition F. With perfect substitutes, incentive compatibility of a transfer over a
link connecting F with W\F depends only on the capacity of the link. As a result, following the
coalitional deviation, agents in F will not default on their promised transfers with agents outside
F. This means that the allocation x0 achieved by the coalitional deviation is IC, weakly improves
all agents’ utility, and strictly improves some agent’s utility, showing that x is not constrained
eﬃcient. Conversely, for any IC x that is Pareto dominated by some IC allocation x0,t h e r ee x i s t s
a coalitional deviation in x where the coalition of all agents F = W chooses x0.
It is easy to see that nonexistence of proﬁtable ex ante coalitional deviations implies nonexistence
of ex post coalitional deviations, too. In fact, any IC transfer arrangement is immune to ex post
coalitional deviations. The proofs of these claims are straightforward, hence omitted.
First-order conditions for general preferences
To present our characterization result for general preferences, ﬁr s tw ed e ﬁne a measure of
marginal social welfare gain of transfers to agents. Fix an IC arrangement x, and recalling the
deﬁnition of acyclical transfer arrangements from the proof of Corollary 2, let t be an acyclical
implementation of x in endowment realization e. Consider the following iterative construction. Let
W1 ⊆ W denote the set of agents i for whom there is no j such that c(i,j) > 0 and the IC constraint
from i to j binds. Since t is acyclical, W1 is nonempty. For any i ∈ W1,l e t∆i = λiUi,x(xi,c i),t h e
marginal beneﬁt of an additional dollar to i. This is both the private and social marginal welfare
gain, because no IC constraint binds for transfers from i.
Suppose now that we have deﬁned the sets W1,...,Wk−1 and the corresponding ∆i for any
i ∈∪ l≤k−1Wl.L e tWk denote the set of agents i such that i/ ∈∪ l≤k−1Wl but whenever c(i,j) > 0
and the IC constraint from i to j binds, j ∈∪ l≤k−1Wl.T od e ﬁne ∆i, ﬁrst denote, for every j such
12This deﬁnition of a coalitional deviation is closely related to the concept of side-deal proof equilibrium in Mobius
and Szeidl (2007).
44that the IC constraint from i to j binds, b xi,j = xi + tij,a n db ci,j = ci − c(i,j),a n dl e t










As we will show below, δij measures the marginal social gain of an additional dollar to i, under the
assumption that i optimally transfers some of the dollar to j. Intuitively, to transfer to j, i has
to increase his own consumption somewhat to maintain incentive compatibility. More formally, we
show below that a share Ui,x(b xi,j,b ci,j)/Ui,x(xi,c i) of the marginal dollar must be kept by i,a n d
only the remaining share can be transferred to j, where it has a welfare impact of ∆j.D e n o t e
δii = λiUi,x(xi,c i), and to account for the softening of the IC constraint over all links, let
∆i =m a x{δij | j : the IC constraint from i to j binds or j = i}.
With this recursive deﬁnition, the marginal social welfare of an additional dollar takes into account
both the marginal increase in i’s consumption, and the softening of the IC constraints which allow
transfers of resources through a chain of agents.
Proposition 12 [Constrained eﬃciency with imperfect substitutes] Assume that MRSi is concave
in xi for every i.. A transfer arrangement t is constrained eﬃcient iﬀ there exist positive (λi)i∈W
such that for every i,j ∈ W one of the following conditions holds:
1) ∆j = ∆i
2) ∆j > ∆i and the IC constraint binds for tij
3) ∆j < ∆i and the IC constraint binds for tji.
Proof. We begin with some preliminary observations. Suppose that the IC constraint from i to
j binds, i.e., Ui(xi,c i)=Ui(xi+tij,b ci,j),a n di receives an additional dollar. Suppose that i keeps a
share α of the dollar and transfers the remaining 1−α such that the IC constraint continues to bind.
Then it must be that αUi,x (xi,c i)=Ui,x (b xi,j,b ci,j), or equivalently, α = Ui,x(xi,c i)/Ui,x(b xi,j,b ci,j).
To maintain incentive compatibility, this share of the dollar has to be consumed by i,a n do n l yt h e
remainder can be transferred to j.
Now we establish the necessity part of the proposition. Fix a constrained eﬃcient arrangement,
and let λi be the associated planner weights. Consider realization e.W eﬁrst show that the marginal
value to the planner of an additional dollar to an agent i is ∆i.L e t i ∈ W1, then the marginal
45value to the planner of endowing i with an additional dollar is at least ∆i. I tc a n n o tb el a r g e r ,
since that would imply that transferring a dollar away from i increases social welfare in the original
allocation, contradicting constrained eﬃciency. Hence, the marginal social value of a dollar to i is
exactly ∆i. Suppose we established for all j ∈∪ l≤k−1Wl that the marginal social value of a dollar
to j is ∆j.L e t i ∈ Wk.F o r a n y j such that the IC constraint from i to j is binding, ∆j is at
least as large as the marginal social value of an additional dollar to i, because otherwise optimality
requires reducing tij. Hence the marginal social value of a dollar to i is obtained when i transfers
as much of the dollar as possible under incentive compatibility to some agent j.G i v e no u ra b o v e
argument, i can transfer at most 1−Ui,x(xi,c i)/Ui,x(b xi,j,b ci,j) to j, hence the marginal welfare gain
if he chooses to transfer to j will be δij.S i n c ei will choose to transfer the dollar to the agent where
it is most productive, the marginal social gain will be the maximum of δij over j,w h i c hi s∆i.
It follows easily that if ∆j > ∆i for some i,j, then the IC constraint for tij has to bind: otherwise
social welfare could be improved by marginally increasing tij. This establishes that in a constrained
eﬃcient allocation, for any endowment realization and any pair of agents one of conditions (1)-(3)
from the theorem have to hold.
For suﬃciency, let now x denote the unique welfare maximizing consumption, let t be an IC
transfer scheme achieving this allocation, and let b ∆i = ∆i(x,t), for every i ∈ W. Assume now
that there exists another consumption vector x0 6= x achieved by IC transfer scheme t0 such that
(x0,t 0) satisfy conditions (1)-(3), and let ∆0
i = ∆i(x0,t 0), for every i ∈ N. Then there exists an
acyclical nonzero transfer scheme td that achieves x from x0, and which is such that t0+td is IC. By
deﬁnition of x, td from x0 improves social welfare. Let now Wd = {i ∈ W|∃ j such that td
ij 6=0 },
and partition Wd into sets Wd
0,...,Wd
K the following way. Let Wd
0 = {i ∈ Wd| −∃j ∈ Wd st
td
ij > 0}.G i v e n Wd
0,...,Wd
k for some k ≥ 0,l e tWd





ij > 0}.N o t et h a tx0
i >x i ∀ i ∈ Wd
0, which together with there being no agent j such that td
ij> 0
implies that ∆0
i < b ∆i. Now we iteratively establish that ∆0
i < b ∆i ∀ i ∈ Wd. Suppose that ∆0




l for some k ≥ 0.L e ti ∈ Wd





ij> 0,a n dt h e r ei sn oj0 ∈ Wd\( ∪
l=0,...,k
Wd
l ) such that td
ij 0 > 0. Suppose ∆0
i ≥ b ∆i.T h i sc a n
only be compatible with td
ij> 0, ∆0
j < b ∆j, and (1)-(3) holding for both (x0,t 0) and (x,t0 + td) if
xi >x 0
i.B u txi >x 0
i,a n d∆0
i0 < b ∆i0 ∀ i0 ∈ W such that td
ii0 > 0 implies ∆0
i < b ∆i, a contradiction.
Hence ∆0
i < b ∆i ∀ i ∈ Wd
k+1, and then by induction ∆0
i < b ∆i ∀ i ∈ Wd. But note that for any
i ∈ Wd
K it holds that xi <x 0
i and there is no j ∈ W such that td
ji > 0, and hence ∆0
i > b ∆i.T h i s
contradicts ∆0
i < b ∆i ∀ i ∈ Wd, hence there cannot be (x0,t 0) satisfying (1)-(3) such that t0 is IC
46and x0 6= x.
Corollary 2 can also be extended to the imperfect substitutes case. Fix a constrained eﬃcient
arrangement, and let e and e0 be two endowment realizations such that ei <e 0
i for some i ∈ W,a n d
ej = e0
j ∀ j ∈ W\{i}.L e tx∗(e) be the consumption in the constrained eﬃcient allocation after e.
Analogously to the perfect substitutes case, let c W (i) the largest set of connected agents containing
i such that all IC constraints within the set are slack.
Corollary 3 [Spillovers with imperfect substitutes] Assume that MRSi is concave, then
(i) [Monotonicity] ∆j(e0) ≥ ∆j(e) for all j,a n di fj ∈ c W (i) then ∆j(e0) > ∆j(e).
(ii) [Local sharing] There exists δ>0 such that |ei − e0
i| <δimplies ∆i = ∆j for all j ∈ c W(i).
(iii) [More sharing with close friends] For any j 6= i, there exists a path i → j such that for any
agent l along the path, ∆l ≤ ∆j.
The proof of this result is analogous to the perfect substitutes case and hence omitted. Note
that (ii) is weaker than in Corollary 2, because even small shocks can spill over the boundaries of
the risk-sharing islands of agent hit by the shocks. Also note that since ∆i = λiUi,x for any agent
not on the boundary of an island, (i) implies that consumption is monotonic in the endowment
realization for such agents.
47FIGURE 1: TRANSFERS IN A PERU SHANTYTOWN
NOTE–Figure shows network of transactions in the map of a shantytown in Peru. Red links
represent financial transactions, and thickness indicates value measured in soles. Blue
respectively green links represent objects of high and low value. Figure is constructed using





C. Binary tree network
FFIGURE 3: RISKSHARING SIMULATIONS
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B. Plane
A. Line
NOTE–Figure shows constrained efficient allocations in the line and plane networks with
binary endowment shocks. For both networks, the black and white panel represents the
endowment realizations and the grey panel represents the “second best” risksharing
arrangement with equal planner weights. The plane allows for better risksharing: in this
realization, SDISP  31% for the line and SDISP  0% for the plane. The line network also
illustrates the emergence of risksharing islands: there is perfect smoothing and equal
consumption within islands, but imperfect smoothing across boundaries.FIGURE 4: UTILITY COST OF SHOCKS TO DIRECT AND INDIRECT
FRIENDS
Size of shock measured by utility cost to i
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